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Most of the modern literature on the development 
of conscience or morality is related to one of two ma-
jor approaches—cognitive, concerned with moral 
reasoning and decision processes, or social learning, 
concerned with the emotional states and behaviors as-
sociated with self-control in the face of temptation. 
Although both approaches are supported by the data 
of a great many studies, the two approaches remain 
essentially unintegrated. We seek to explicate some 
of the important steps in the translation of moral de-
cision into moral behavior and to apply that analysis 
to an explanation of why certain moral socialization 
techniques are more conducive to internalization than 
others. Our theoretical perspective is presented in the 
early sections of the article; two supporting studies 
follow. The emphasis of the fi nal section is on the rel-
evance of the theory to traditional approaches to mo-
rality and to the socialization literature.
The theory can be stated in outline as follows: 
Behavior associated with self-control in the con-
text of temptation is heavily infl uenced by negative 
emotional states usually characterized as anxiety, 
fear, guilt, and/or shame. This emotional mediation 
of moral behavior continues into adulthood, when 
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Abstract: A theory is presented concerning the impact of attributions about the causes of emotional responses 
as they infl uence self-control in temptation situations. Research is reviewed indicating a high level of adult 
sensitivity to external infl uence in making such causal attributions. Two studies are presented in which the 
post transgression emotions of second-grade children are labeled shame (because of being found out) or guilt 
(due to the transgression itself); when a similar situation was subsequently represented as safe from detection, 
shame-condition children transgressed 60–80% more than guilt-condition subjects. It is suggested that emo-
tional arousal elicited in temptation situations because of past punishment or options that are inconsistent with 
the self-image is necessary for inhibition but not suffi cient unless attributed to a relevant cause. The literature 
on the relative effectiveness of moral socialization techniques is discussed with respect to the theory, and the 
relevance to cognitive dissonance and to overjustifi cation approaches to motivation is discussed. An integration 
of social-learning and cognitive-developmental theories is approached through explicating the translation of 
moral decision into behavior by focusing on the ways that cognition may exert partial control over the impact 
of less fi nely differentiated emotional response, allowing cognitive overrides of contradictory emotional dispo-
sitions without eliminating the emotion. 
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the resultant behavior may relate to higher orders 
of moral judgment as defi ned by modern cognitive 
approaches to morality. Although the association of 
these negative emotional states with decisional and 
behavioral processes may take place in part through 
mechanisms of conditioning and learning specifi ed 
by traditional avoidance learning theorists (e.g., 
Mowrer, 1950), these associations depend heavily 
on the causal attributions that are made about the 
source of the negative emotions during socialization 
experiences. Social and situational infl uences (often 
temporary) play an important role in forming causal 
attributions; different physical and verbal socializa-
tion techniques particularly provide different infor-
mation relevant to the child’s causal attributions. 
Later, in the face of temptation, the impact of the 
emotion response on behavior will be heavily infl u-
enced by the still malleable beliefs held about the 
causal origins of the emotional response. When the 
individual believes detection of transgression is not 
possible, a negative emotional response in the face 
of temptation is necessary but not suffi cient for the 
inhibition of transgression. In order for that emo-
tional arousal to serve an inhibitory function, the in-
dividual must identify his emotional discomfort as 
due to a relevant cause, such as the transgression 
per se (and the implications of the transgression for 
self-image, etc.), rather than as due to an irrelevant 
cause, such as the fear of punishment. With matu-
rity, control of emotional attributions passes from 
the socializing agent to the individual and becomes 
related to the level of moral development, although 
situational and social cues continue to play an im-
portant role.
EM O T I O N AT T R I B U T I O N
The work of Schachter and Singer (1962) dem-
onstrated that when subjects injected with adren-
alin did not anticipate that arousal effects would re-
sult, they tended to attribute their emotional state to 
the situation, feeling happier or angrier depending on 
the specifi c post injection experimental context. That 
study was the fi rst in a series by Schachter, his stu-
dents, and others that indicated that people are quite 
fl exible in the manner in which they make causal in-
ferences about the source and meaning of their emo-
tional arousal. 
Subsequent research exploring the implications 
of those fi ndings for moral behavior followed the 
work of Lykken (1957). Lykken had shown that 
psychopathic individuals seemed not to experience 
normal emotion-induced inhibitions. Schachter and 
Latané (1964) demonstrated that psychopathic crim-
inals (compared to normal criminals) would learn 
to avoid shocked errors (compared to nonshocked 
errors) in a lever-maze task only after sustaining 
arousal from an adrenalin injection. Schachter and 
Ono (cited in Schachter & Latané, 1964) found in-
creased cheating by college students who had re-
ceived the tranquilizer chlorpromazine (compared 
to placebo control groups). These studies can be 
viewed as evidence of the necessity of emotional 
arousal as an important component in the avoidance 
of responses with aversive consequences, with an 
increase in arousal facilitating that avoidance and 
a decrease attenuating avoidance. However, since 
only the degree of arousal was manipulated, and not 
interferences the subject might make concerning 
causal attribution, the necessity of arousal was dem-
onstrated but the issue of the suffi ciency of arousal 
was not addressed.
By illustrating the role of emotional  arousal, these 
data provided support for Mowrer’s (1950) two-factor 
avoidance model. Mowrer’s model emphasized that 
the emotional response that the organism developed 
in response to the cues signaling an aversive event 
would motivate the avoidance response, which, when 
successful, would lead to the reinforcing reduction of 
the negative emotional state.1 Emotional arousal in 
anticipation of punishment for a potential transgres-
sion should, by this interpretation, lead to the avoid-
ance of the temptation behavior. But Schachter and 
Latané (1964) speculated that for the psychopath, the 
avoidance of behavior with aversive consequences 
depended on more than the mere presence of arousal. 
1 More modern theorists have extended this perspective, 
suggesting that anxiety becomes conditioned specifi cally to 
the “behavioral and cognitive precursors of the act” (Aron-
freed, 1968, pp. 54–55).
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Psychopaths experience a high level of physiological 
arousal with no apparent subjective emotional dis-
tress in response to cues that would evoke an emo-
tional response in normal individuals. Schachter 
and Latané suggested that it was the chronic inabil-
ity of the psychopath to experience his physiological 
arousal as emotion that accounted for his moral in-
sensitivity.2 These suggestions approach the perspec-
tive proposed in this article, but our view differs by 
suggesting that even in temptation situations where 
arousal is experienced as emotion, specifi c causal at-
tributions are crucial in determining the behavioral 
outcome.
It was the Schachter and Latané (1964) research 
that led to a series of studies by the fi rst author in-
dicating that college-age men and women more often 
succumbed to the temptation to cheat when they could 
attribute the emotional arousal associated with cheat-
ing to a placebo pill, which supposedly had associ-
ated emotional side effects (Dienstbier, 1972; Dienst-
bier & Munter, 1971). Whereas Schachter and Singer 
(1962) had demonstrated that external cues are impor-
tant in allowing the attribution of and experiencing of 
artifi cially induced arousal as specifi c emotion, the 
cheating research demonstrated the reverse—that nat-
urally induced specifi c emotions could be interpreted 
as nonspecifi c arousal when subjects attributed the as-
sociated arousal to a nonemotionally relevant source 
such as the placebo pill. Since these cheating studies
are important for the theoretical perspective devel-
oped in this article, they are reviewed here in some 
detail.
Recruited as participants in a study on the effects of 
a vitamin supplement on vision, subjects were given 
a vocabulary test as a “delay task while waiting for 
the pill to take effect.” Besides anticipating visual ef-
fects from the pill, a random half of the subjects were 
led to anticipate arousal effects of “a pounding heart, 
hand tremor, sweaty palms, a warm or fl ushed face, 
and a tight or sinking feeling in the stomach” (follow-
ing Nisbett & Schachter, 1966). Control subjects an-
ticipated benign side effects irrelevant to arousal. Af-
ter the vocabulary test, to validate the potency of the 
pill, subjects viewed the auto-kinetic illusion, and 
were led to understand that the pill was responsible 
for their seeing the immobile light as moving. There-
after, subjects were given the opportunity to check 
over their vocabulary test answers and to see the cor-
rect answers. They were informed that the department 
developing the vocabulary test was interested in using 
it for future prediction of college success, and that the 
“board of psychologists” responsible for it would like 
to interview any students who did particularly poorly 
on the test (less than 20 right). The test was designed 
so that less than 1% of college freshmen could attain 
that score without cheating.
The period during which the individual could look 
over the correct answers to the vocabulary test and his 
own answers was also introduced as a “delay period,” 
in this case prior to the rating of side effects because 
“it was important that the subjects rate the side effects 
they might be experiencing just 9 minutes after they 
had experienced the visual effects.” The salience of 
the side effects expectation was increased for that pe-
riod by having subjects look over a side effects check-
list at the onset of that period. Any cheating that took 
place during the delay period could be detected be-
cause pressure-sensitive paper (making a second copy 
of the answers) was placed under the answer paper 
during the taking of the test; the answer paper was re-
moved by the subjects prior to the cheating period, so 
that thereafter any changes made on the real answer 
paper would not correspond to those on the pressure-
sensitive paper .
2 Suggestions by Mandler (1964) and the theoretical struc-
ture proposed by Lazarus (1968) are useful in understand-
ing possible mechanisms to account for the psychopath’s lack 
of emotional experience in the face of arousal. Mandler sug-
gested that the childhood of the typical psychopath is charac-
terized by frequent emotional upheaval~ and that the individ-
ual might learn to minimize the emotional discomfort of these 
frequent traumas by ignoring the physiological signals from 
his body, which, if allowed to contribute to a strong emotional 
feeling, would greatly accentuate his distress.
Mandler’s suggestions fi t well with Lazarus’s (1968) con-
cept of benign reappraisal, the process by which the stress 
reaction is reduced by a cognitive reappraisal involving a 
lowered assessment of the potential danger in a situation af-
ter the individual has adjudged that he is powerless to affect 
the outcome.
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In the fi rst study (Dienstbier & Munter, 1971) 
49% of the subjects who anticipated arousal side ef-
fects from their placebo pills cheated, compared to 
27% of the control condition, with cheating defi ned 
as changing any answers, This signifi cant difference 
became more impressive when it was noted that the 
entire effect was due to the male subjects, whose 
cheating rates were 56% and 17% in the two con-
ditions, respectively. Follow-up research (Dienst-
bier, 1972) indicated that women, too, respond to the 
arousal placebo with increased cheating if the threat 
of the consequences for failure is made less fright-
ening (it appeared that in the original study the more 
intense anxiety experienced by women in response 
to the threat of being called by the “board of psy-
chologists” interfered with their attending to the pill 
side effects). In a second study reported in the same 
article, it was further determined that the effect of 
the arousal placebo in reducing resistance to temp-
tation was indeed due to the subject’s attributing 
specifi cally to the pill—merely attending to arousal 
feelings without having taken the placebo did not 
produce the effect.
It appeared that all subjects experienced emo-
tional arousal while confronting the temptation to 
cheat, largely as a result of considering the act of 
cheating and the potential negative consequences. 
But when subjects could attribute the cause of their 
arousal to the pill, that arousal ceased to have an in-
hibiting effect. It is not, in other words, that the sub-
jects in either pill condition experienced more or less 
arousal. but rather that the attribution of the arousal 
to a neutral source (in the arousal pill condition) de-
fused that arousal, preventing it from having emo-
tional relevance.3
3 There are two lines of evidence suggesting that subjects 
make the attributions of emotional causality at a less than ver-
bally conscious level. First, when subjects were interviewed, 
none ever indicated conscious awareness of such a decisional 
process. (Subjects were completely debriefed and questioned 
concerning possible suspiciousness following the cheating 
research.) Second, at the end of the cheating period, when 
arousal subjects rated the degree to which they experienced 
the arousal side effects, the rate of reporting such side effects
Whereas Schachter and Latané (1964) had specu-
lated that this process in chronic form accounted for 
the moral insensitivity of the psychopath, the cheating 
studies suggested that the same process could be dem-
onstrated to produce episodes of moral insensitivity in 
normal subjects. 
The work of Solomon and Wynne (1954) and sub-
sequent researchers emphasized that although emo-
tional arousal was necessary in the acquisition of 
avoidance responses, the elimination of overt signs 
of arousal was often observed once such responses 
had been well learned. Except for the Schachter and 
Ono data (cited in Schachter & Latané 1964), which 
demonstrated increased cheating with chloroproma-
zine, we would not have anticipated, therefore, that 
emotional arousal played any role in moral deci-
sion making for normal adults. Yet the cheating re-
sults suggested that even for 19-year-olds in tempta-
tion situations, the avoidance of transgression is still 
heavily dependent on emotional arousal. Addition-
ally, the studies demonstrated that although 19-year-
old adults should have had considerable experience 
in learning which features of their own behavior 
and of the environment lead to negative emotional 
arousal, they were surprisingly susceptible to exter-
nal infl uences in attributing arousal experienced in 
the face of temptation.
But however powerful these data are, they do not 
provide the theoretical bridge to our fi nal point. Our 
thesis requires that we demonstrate more than the de-
fusing of emotional arousal through attribution to a 
non-emotional source in a context as artifi cial as that 
associated with the placebo pill studies, We must dem-
onstrate instead that emotional arousal may be defused
was surprisingly low. (There was, unfortunately, no control 
group with which they could be compared on this dimension, 
since the benign symptom subjects rated themselves on the 
benign symptoms.) It appears, therefore, that although the in-
formation concerning expected symptoms is given verbally, 
thereafter the very signifi cant impact that these symptom ex-
pectations have upon cheating behavior is achieved by pro-
cesses not apparent to the subject.
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for moral behavior even though still experienced as 
negative emotion, through the attribution to an emo-
tion-inducing source that has no direct relevance to 
the moral decision.
SOCIALIZATION AND EMOTION ATTRIBUTION
We speculated that children would be even more 
receptive than adults had proven to be to cues that 
would suggest different causal attributions for emo-
tional arousal, and that these cues would play an im-
portant role in determining the impact of socializa-
tion processes. Specifi cally, if a socialization pattern 
left the child with the impression that the cause of his 
emotional arousal or discomfort was his own misbe-
havior, the impact of this internal orientation on the 
child’s behavior would be very different from the im-
pact of an external orientation in which equally in-
tense emotion was thought to be caused by fear of 
punishment. The latter attribution would be particu-
larly ineffective in situations in which the tempted in-
dividual could be certain that detection was impossi-
ble.
Even early in their socialization history, most nor-
mal children will experience some emotional arousal 
following transgression and detection by a disapprov-
ing adult. Several features of the situation naturally 
lead to that arousal: the child’s knowledge that the 
adult disapproves, previous scoldings now recalled, 
anxiety over the uncertainty of the outcome, and the 
likelihood that the adult will emphasize the discrep-
ancy between the child’s behavior and higher stan-
dards. The manner in which the socializing agent re-
sponds to the child’s transgression will infl uence the 
causal attributions the child will make about his emo-
tional discomfort. Socialization procedures that draw 
the child’s attention to the transgression rather than to 
the aftermath (confrontation and punishment) facili-
tate the attribution of arousal to the act of transgres-
sion. Generally, such procedures involve discussions 
of the transgression in a manner that does not threaten 
the child, so that the child is able to dwell on the trans-
gression itself and the behavioral standards he has vi-
olated, rather than on the threat that confrontation of-
fers. Often the self-concept is manipulated (e.g., “you 
are a bad boy”) in relation to the standard or behavior 
(“because you didn’t listen and lied”). The attribution 
of arousal to the anticipated transgression later leads 
the child to avoid the transgression itself. On the other 
hand, responses by socializing agents that threaten the 
child or that become salient through pain draw suf-
fi cient attention away from the transgression so that 
the child is likely to attribute his emotional discom-
fort exclusively to confrontation with the socializing 
agent. When later facing a similar temptation situa-
tion, a child treated in the latter manner might expe-
rience a high level of emotional arousal, but by attrib-
uting his arousal to fear of detection and punishment 
he would tend to resist temptation only if he believed 
that detection was likely.
In our research with children we wished to buttress 
our theory by establishing a temptation and transgres-
sion situation in which the emotional arousal follow-
ing detection would be equal for the two groups of 
children, with the children assured that future trans-
gressions could not be detected. We then imparted to 
the children an internal (due to own behavior) or an 
external (due to confrontation) causal attribution con-
cerning the source of that emotional arousal. It was 
hypothesized that the children who believed that they 
“felt bad” for their previous transgression (internal 
orientation, or guilt) would misbehave far less than 
children in the same situation who believed that they 
“felt bad” because their previous transgression had 
been detected (external orientation, or shame).
STUDY 1
Method
In Study 1 of the two studies with children, second-
grade subjects were brought, one at a time, to a “new toy 
room” in their school and were asked to keep watching 
a slot car go slowly around an oval track during the ex-
perimenter’s absence; they were to stop the car with a 
control device if the car began to go too fast. Although 
the child was given suffi cient justifi cation for watch-
ing the car, other electrical toys “with loose wires” con-
trolled by a hidden observer4 were started and stopped 
according to a schedule to distract the child. If the child 
transgressed by allowing himself to be distracted from 
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the implied duty of watching the slot car, the observer 
caused the slot car to jump the track (the event that was 
supposed to be avoided) and simultaneously signaled the 
experimenter to return.
Pretending that the slot car was broken, the experi-
menter asked the child to accompany him to a separate 
room, where the independent manipulation was admin-
istered: labeling the child’s feelings as due to trans-
gression (guilt) or due to being found out following the 
transgression (shame). The child was then returned to 
the room, taught to operate the slot car correctly, and as-
sured that this “new” car would not break if it jumped 
the track; he was also assured that the door would now 
be locked and the experimenter did not have a key, im-
plying that detection of transgression of failing to watch 
the slot car would be impossible. The dependent mea-
sure was the total time spent not attending to the slot car 
during this second watching phase of 12 minutes (with 
the experimenter absent). A reliability of .99 was ob-
tained between two observers for fi ve subjects; thereaf-
ter one observer was used.
One male and one female experimenter participated,5 
each using boys and girls as subjects, so that with the in-
dependent manipulation of guilt versus shame, a 2 × 2 × 
2 factorial design was effected.
Results
Results indicated no signifi cant effects for either 
the sex of experimenter or children, but the nonsig-
nifi cant difference between the mean seconds trans-
gressing for the shame condition (164) and the guilt 
condition (102) were suggestive. A further analysis in-
dicated that most of the demonstrated increased effec-
tiveness for the guilt manipulation was due to the fe-
male experimenter—187 seconds transgressing in the 
shame condition, compared to 80 seconds in the guilt 
condition, t(22) = 1.91, p < .07, two tailed. It was our 
impression that a real difference did exist, despite the 
lack of a signifi cant main effect for the shame versus 
guilt conditions or an experimenter by condition inter-
action. It was suspected that the differences between 
experimenters were due to their different experience 
levels with children (the more effective one was an el-
ementary school teacher and a parent) rather than a 
true sex difference. 
The inconclusiveness of the fi ndings of Study 1 
led to the changes incorporated into the second study, 
which will be presented in somewhat greater detail.
STUDY 2
In an effort to reduce the variations in background 
between children in the two conditions and to allow 
a matched-pair type of analysis, second-grade twins 
were recruited by seeking the cooperation of their par-
ents and of the twins themselves, Except for some mi-
nor changes in procedure and script and the participa-
tion of only one experimenter (the fi rst author, who fi t 
the criterion of having suffi cient experience with chil-
dren), the design of the study was essentially the same 
as for Study 1. Children were not considered sepa-
rately by sex, since the results of Study 1 suggested 
no sex differences.
Method
The fi rst twin to participate was chosen randomly 
and brought to the toy room while the other twin played 
quietly with an assistant in the waiting room. The par-
ticipating twin was seated in front of the booth and was 
told that the slot car presently on the track was very old 
so it might break if it did fall off the track, but that the 
problem with the cars sometimes going too fast was in 
the track. The experimenter’s fi rst absence was so that 
he could “go to call the man who fi xes the toys.” The 
scheduled use of distraction toys such as the electric 
train “with the loose wires” was essentially the same 
as in the fi rst phase of Study 1. Although the criterion 
time before the slot car would jump the track and the 
booth light would go on for the fi rst twin was 6 contin-
uous seconds of distraction, if the child had not met that 
criterion by the end of the 6th minute, the criterion time 
was reduced by 1 second for each passing minute of at-
tentiveness of the child. Since the members of each twin 
pair tended to act remarkably alike, their fi rst phase par-
ticipation times tended to be very similar.
Immediately following the child’s transgression, the 
experimenter returned. Upon “discovering the transgre 
sion and the “broken” slot car, the experimenter asked 
the child to accompany him to the adjoining room, 
where he identifi ed the twin’s experimental condition 
and administered the appropriate manipulation accord-
ing to the following script (the sections in parentheses 
indicate the additions that change the basic guilt script to 
4 A role fi lled by the second and fi fth authors.
5 A role fi lled by the third and fourth authors.
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the shame script, or where two sets of parentheses occur 
together, the fi rst is the shame section and the second the 
guilt section:
I bet you feel a little bad now that (I found out) the 
car fell off, I’ve seen other kids feel bad when (some-
one found out) they weren’t able to do exactly what 
they were supposed to do. When the other kids who 
tried to watch the car couldn’t, they felt bad (when I 
found out) too.
But it’s important that we do stop the car when the 
light fi rst comes on, and before it fl ies off the track, so 
we’ll try again with this new car. You won’t feel bad if (I 
fi nd this car still) (this car stays) on the track—if (I fi nd) 
you’ve done a good job, you’ll feel good, won’t you ?
Have you noticed that when other kids (can show 
people that they) have done the right thing, that they 
feel good ? And when (people fi nd out) they did things 
they were not supposed to, they feel bad, don’t they? 
(when someone fi nds out) (Even if no one ever fi nds 
out) they feel bad for not doing what they were sup-
posed to do, don’t they ?
After returning to the toy room, the child was di-
rectly informed that since he now was being taught to 
start and control the new unbreakable car, and since the 
door would be locked and the experimenter had no key, 
that “even if it did fl y off the track I’d never fi nd out, 
since you could put it back by yourself and I can’t come 
right in with the door locked.” Most children spontane-
ously acknowledged that this was true. With that state-
ment, the experimenter signaled the observer6 to put his 
hand over his ears while the fi nal part of the independent 
manipulation was administered: “Remember, you’d feel 
bad if (I ever found out you did a bad job) (you did a bad 
job, even if I never found out). There is no way that I 
could fi nd out this time, though.” The experimenter then 
left the room, locking the door and very loudly checking 
it to make sure it was adequately locked.
A 12-minute period, spiced with the same distracting 
toys starting up and the same dependent measure (the 
time spent not attending to the slot cars) was identical to 
the second phase of Study 1.
Results and Conclusions
Of the nine pairs of twins who came to the labora-
tory, complete data were gathered for six pairs, Two 
pairs were lost because one of the twins failed to follow 
instructions by shutting off the slot car so that he would 
not have to watch it, One pair was not run because the 
twins were hyperactive and inattentive. For each of the 
six pairs run, the twin receiving the shame instructions 
Figure 1. Seconds transgressing for the members of each 
pair of twins according to condition.
transgressed almost twice as much as the twin in the 
guilt condition. The average time transgressing was 322 
seconds for the shame condition, and 177 seconds for 
the guilt condition t(5) = 8.0, p < .001, two tailed. The 
regularity of the effect across pairs of twins is illustrated 
by Figure 1.
It is apparent that 8-year-old children are suffi ciently 
cognitively sophisticated so that the differences between 
the guilt and shame manipulations are perceived, even 
in the face of the anxiety elicited by the confrontation 
with a mildly disapproving and strange adult. Addition-
ally, the fi ndings of 60% (Study 1) and 80% (Study 2) 
increases in transgression time for shame subjects over 
guilt subjects support conclusions from the adult cheat-
ing studies—the attribution of emotional causality has a 
large impact on the behavior of children in resistance-to-
temptation situations.
8 Thanks are due Steve Slane for his faithful and compe-
tent fi lling of the observer role.
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The degree to which the two child studies are ac-
ceptable as powerful support of the theoretical de-
velopment is dependent on several assumptions that 
cannot be empirically demonstrated. Although we 
endeavored to maintain equal levels of emotional 
arousal for the children in the two conditions, and al-
though there are no apparent reasons why the shame 
or guilt script variations might have induced differ-
ent arousal levels, no direct assessment of emotional 
arousal was made. Also, we cannot be certain that the 
greater effectiveness of the guilt script was not due 
to one of the scripts drawing the subject’s attention 
to considerations irrelevant to the attribution of emo-
tional arousal. It might have appeared, for example, 
that the experimenter was less interested in the behav-
ior of the children in the shame condition. Although 
the similarity of the scripts was meant to preclude 
this possibility, it is impossible to be certain that the 
script differences did not trigger different reactions 
between the children in the two conditions. However, 
since neither of these two explanations could easily he 
used to explain the results of the cheating studies with 
adults, the hypothesis involving the causal attributions 
of emotional arousal seems the only likely explana-
tion common to both research approaches. Although 
the following discussion assumes that the child stud-
ies provide strong empirical support for the theoret-
ical developments, we believe that it is possible to 
follow and accept the theoretical aspects of our the-
sis without being totally convinced of the relevance of 
the data from the child studies.
One possible approach to explaining the high de-
pendence of our child and adult subjects on external 
cues rather than past experience in making causal at-
tributions of emotional arousal is to suggest that this 
fl exibility is greatest when the emotional state in ques-
tion is an uncomfortable one. Some support-by-de-
fault for this view comes from the emotion-attribution 
literature; the impact of causal attribution manipula-
tions has been convincingly demonstrated only with 
the negative emotions of anxiety, fear, and startle re-
sponse (Dienstbier, 1972; Dienstbier & Munter, 1971; 
Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Ross, Rodin, & Zimbardo, 
1969; Storms & Nisbett, 1970; Zanna & Cooper, 
1974). In the fi rst author’s research, several failures to 
observe the causal reattribution of arousal associated 
with emotions not related to fear reinforced this view. 
Further support is provided by the research of Lazarus 
and his associates (Lazarus, 1968), who have demon-
strated a readiness in their subjects to use cognitive 
information that allows the reduction of stress.
Another approach to understanding the apparent 
ease with which the children accepted the attribution 
of arousal to their own behavior or internal causes 
rather than to detection or external causes is to focus 
on the readiness of children in this age category to ac-
cept such internal attributions. Wolman, Lewis, and 
King (1971) demonstrated that as children pass from 
“young” (ages 5–7) through “middle” (ages 8–9) to 
“old” (ages 10–13) categories, they report that the 
conditions that stimulate emotions more frequently 
come from within themselves. Kagan (1971) has sum-
marized a wide range of literature suggesting that the 
child’s capacity for guilt increases most rapidly be-
tween the ages of 4 and 10.
RELEVANCE TO MAJOR THEORETICAL 
APPROACHES
Social Learning Approaches
Infl uenced heavily by traditional learning theory 
on the one hand, and by the psychoanalytic concept 
of identifi cation on the other, the social learning ap-
proach to morality has progressed in the direction of 
the analyses of those features of the model that fa-
cilitate identifi cation and those features of discipline 
techniques that facilitate resistance to temptation and 
appropriate affect.
Since the impact of modeling and identifi cation re-
search appears to be waning, we will not attempt an 
integration of our view with that branch of the social 
learning literature.7 
7 The modeling literature, typifi ed by the work of Bandura 
and his associates (Bandura, 1968) and Sears and his associ-
ates (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Sears, Rau, & Alpert, 
1965), has never freed itself from the issues of identifi cation 
versus simple imitation, and in the 1970s seems to have lost 
its appeal as a research area. The failure of many major stud-
ies in this area to fi nd convincing evidence of causal links be-
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Instead, our discussion will be concerned with so-
cialization techniques and the impact of those tech-
niques on the affective and cognitive responses that 
facilitate resistance to temptation. Several issues in 
the social learning and the socialization-of-moral-
ity literature will be viewed from our theoretical per-
spective.
Punishment. As a behavior modifi cation technique, 
and as demonstrated in many laboratory studies, pun-
ishment (including physical) is often a viable control 
technique. That punishment is effective in behavioral 
control (so that its various parameters bear analysis) is 
seldom questioned, and those laboratory studies that 
have compared punished and nonpunished control 
groups have generally demonstrated the superiority of 
punishment in behavioral suppression (see Johnston, 
1972, for a recent review). But the socialization lit-
erature based on naturalistic observation in home and 
school settings indicates that the use of physical pun-
ishment is negatively associated with the internaliza-
tion of social control (Bacon, Child, & Barry, 1963; 
MacKinnon, 1938; Maurer, 1974; Nowicki & Segal, 
1974; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Sears, Rau, & 
Albert, 1965).
The dilemma of physical or power-oriented pun-
ishment being successful in the laboratory and coun-
terproductive in less controlled settings, particularly 
as compared to induction, relates to our approach 
according to the following analysis. When all other 
things are equal, the more severe the punishment, the 
more the emotional arousal and the more the resis-
tance to deviation in the future, unless the more in-
tense punishment causes different attributions about 
the source of the emotional discomfort associated 
with that situation or distracts from other adminis-
tered messages relevant to emotional attribution. The 
fi rst part of that statement is an affi rmation of classi-
cal avoidance theory—that greater arousal will lead
to more resistance to deviation. But, as is also sug-
gested, intense physical punishment should indeed 
cause different attributions of arousal from either 
mild punishment or other disciplinary techniques 
that do not direct attention away from the transgres-
sion, If the physically punished individual faces fu-
ture temptation in situations in which detection 
seems unlikely, then we would predict a paradoxical 
effect, with more intense punishment or more phys-
ically oriented punishment leading to less resistance 
to temptation.
Punishment that is love oriented, however, 
seems less destructive in its impact on the develop-
ment of resistance to temptation. There are several 
reasons why such techniques are less counterpro-
ductive than physical discipline and why they are 
found to be positive in some studies, While physi-
cal punishment is usually accompanied by parental 
expressions of anger, encouraging similar expres-
sions in the child, love-withdrawal techniques are 
associated with anger inhibition (Hoffman, 1970) 
in the child: the experiencing of anger by the child 
suggests that emotional arousal is being attributed 
to confrontation with the parent, Additionally, the 
love-withdrawal techniques tend to leave the child 
in a state of emotional discomfort for longer peri-
ods, with the termination of such punishment of-
ten dependent on some action or statement by the 
child that relates to the child’s initial transgression. 
Expressions such as “I’m sorry that I did that” are 
emotional attribution statements frequently encour-
aged by parents in psychological punishment situ-
ations prior to the termination of the punishment. 
That love-oriented techniques have sometimes been 
found to be most effective when practiced by warm 
parents (i.e., Sears et al., 1957) may be due to the 
child’s fi nding it more diffi cult to attribute his dis-
comfort to the warm parents’ behavior, rather than 
to his own. The fact that with greater warmth, there 
is more love to withdraw in the punishment situa-
tion is also relevant.
Due to the unfamiliarity and associated uncer-
tainty that the young subject experiences in the lab-
oratory, combined with (usually, in our view) insuf-
tween identifi cation and resistance to temptations (i.e., Sears 
et al., 1965) has led the author of one signifi cant recent review 
to suggest that the evidence linking morality and identifi cation 
was meager at best (Hoffman, 1970). While the disinhibiting 
effects of a transgressing model seemed established, the inhib-
iting effects of a self-denying model were not.
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fi cient assurances of the undetectability of deviance, 
the laboratory provides neither a setting in which 
the exclusive attribution of arousal to punishment 
is likely nor one in which feelings of total freedom 
from detection are likely. In laboratory studies the 
punished child therefore usually appears more self-
controlled than the nonpunished control. Unfortu-
nately, a complete resolution of this point is not pos-
sible by reference to the morality literature, since 
researchers seldom attempt to provide evidence that 
their children were convinced that their transgres-
sions could not be detected. Given that the labora-
tory is often quite unfamiliar to the research subjects, 
for young children to be secure in their belief of un-
detectability considerable effort should be devoted 
to the staging of experimental situations; if possible, 
the impossibility of detection should be articulated 
to the child (as in Study 2).
Naturalistic settings often permit the child to 
make causal attributions that negate the effect of 
punishment and lead to freedom from detection. In 
a home or classroom the harshly or frequently pun-
ished child has repeated opportunities to make accu-
rate attributions that the negative emotions he experi-
ences are due to confrontation and punishment rather 
than transgression and to become certain about when 
detection is possible. Those accurate emotional at-
tributions facilitated by repeated experience in nat-
ural settings are not conducive to internalization. 
With the development of accurate attributions about 
the source of negative emotional arousal, either of 
two types of results may obtain (probably most such 
situations result in some of each of these two pro-
cesses). The fi rst process has been emphasized by 
those social learning theorists who have been heav-
ily infl uenced by the traditional avoidance model ex-
emplifi ed by Mowrer’s (1950) work, but who must 
explain the data that indicate the ineffectiveness of 
punishment in natural settings. Simply stated, that 
view suggests that the punished child learns accurate 
discriminatory’ cues so that no arousal results dur-
ing transgressions that occur in the absence of pun-
ishing agents. While it is apparent that such a pro-
cess may take place, we would argue that there are a 
great many temptation situations for normal individ-
uals in which arousal is elicited even though the in-
dividual is fully aware that detection is impossible; 
both the cheating studies and our child studies pro-
vided situations designed to make detection appear 
impossible, yet arousal and the causal attributions 
made about that arousal played a key role in deter-
mining the outcome.
We seek what we perceive to be a necessary 
middle ground between older theories which em-
phasize automatic conditioning procedures to the 
exclusion of cognitive processes, and more modern 
approaches, which emphasize total cognitive con-
trol over the learning of contingencies. The older 
view (Mowrer, 1950), suggesting a classical-con-
ditioning-like mechanism to account for the attach-
ment of negative emotions to situations and behav-
ior, could not account for data such as that offered 
in the cheating studies or the child studies, in which 
cognitive interpretations given to subjects relevant 
to the meaning of their emotional arousal had im-
portant effects. More modern approaches, such as 
that of Bindra (1974), suggest that reinforcing or 
punishing events do not directly affect the strength 
of the preceding response; rather what is learned 
are the “contingent relations” existing between the 
events of the situation. Bandura (1969, p. 553) sug-
gests a similar relationship in stating that the clas-
sical-conditioning-like aversive techniques used in 
behavior modifi cation procedures affect the client 
only to the extent that he is consciously willing to 
recall and revisualize or reexperience the therapy 
situation when faced with temptation in later out-
side situations.
Our view suggests a greater degree of autonomy 
between cognition and emotion, with cognition in-
fl uenced by, but not under the total control of emo-
tional arousal, and emotional arousal likewise infl u-
enced by, but not completely controlled by cognition 
interpretations. Thus the cognitive knowledge pos-
sessed by particularly the very young child that his 
emotional upset in the face of temptation stems di-
rectly from previous punishment may not eliminate 
that emotion when detection is thought to be impos-
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sible; rather, such a causal attribution will make the 
emotion irrelevant and will allow the child to act 
somewhat as if the emotion were not present. To il-
lustrate this cognition-emotion interaction, consider 
behavior in the face of a mild phobia. The fear ex-
perienced by an acrophobic adult while climbing 
an open stairway may be as intense when the fear 
is cognitively perceived to be unjustifi ed (the stairs 
are safe) as when it is perceived to be justifi ed (the 
stairs may break); yet through moderate fear levels, 
such cognitions will determine whether the individ-
ual will override his emotional arousal and continue 
to climb. We present the acrophobia illustration as 
more than a metaphor and suggest that many of the 
more important moral prohibitions learned by in-
dividuals with well-developed consciences have a 
phobia-like character, with emotional arousal elic-
ited even though the tempted individual may cog-
nitively appraise the situation as perfectly safe from 
detection. Such an appraisal allows the emotion to 
be overridden without being eliminated if the indi-
vidual attributes his arousal to a fear of detection or 
to other causes that may be irrelevant if detection is 
impossible.8
Recent research by Loftis and Ross (1974) sug-
gests the possibility of a second effect resulting from 
different causal attributions. After the acquisition of 
an emotional response, the extinction rate for that re-
sponse may depend in part on the source to which 
the individual retrospectively attributes his emotional 
arousal. In their research, a tone was heard while a 
shock-induced emotional reaction, as measured by 
galvanic skin response (GSR), was conditioned to a 
light. When later instructions indicated that the emo-
tional arousal could be attributed to the tone, extinc-
8 An extreme example of an apparently similar process is 
found in the work of Fenz and Epstein (Epstein, 1967) with 
skydivers. Although emotional arousal as indicated by phys-
iological monitoring remains high as the skydiver gains ex-
perience, his view of the sport as not posing objective dan-
ger allows the enthusiast to jump. The changing attributions 
fostered by experience allow the experience of intense excite-
ment where previously fear had dominated.
tion of the GSR was faster (compared to a control 
group for which the tone was not described as arous-
ing), even though no tone was used during extinc-
tion, Thus, although our view emphasizes that emo-
tional arousal will have differential effects depending 
on the causal attributions made, we do not exclude 
the process of different attributions eventually af-
fecting arousal level, With respect to moral behav-
ior, the two processes should tend to infl uence re-
sponses similarly, with attributions that arousal is 
due to irrelevant sources (such as fear of punishment 
when detection is not possible) both negating the ef-
fect of the arousal and, with repeated experience, 
leading to a reduction in emotional arousal as well.
Techniques such as induction (Hoffman, 1970), 
which do not depend on punishment, will undoubt-
edly result in less negative emotional arousal asso-
ciated with transgression than techniques based on 
punishment; but successful induction, involving the 
explanation to the child of why certain behaviors 
are right or wrong, focuses attention on the behav-
ior per se, so that the arousal that is present during 
such socialization episodes will be attributed to the 
act of transgression rather than to the threat of pun-
ishment. Hoffman’s review indicates that induction 
is more effective in moral socialization than pun-
ishment-based techniques, even including love-ori-
ented punishment. Our emphasis on the necessity 
of arousal for induction to be effective is relevant 
to Aronfreed’s (1968, p. 9) suggestion that “avail-
able evidence usually points to great discrepancies 
between children’s verbal expression of evaluative 
standards and their actual behavior in a real social 
context.” The data of Henshel (1971), indicating in-
creasing correlations (from fourth to seventh grade) 
between honesty assessed verbally and resistance to 
temptation in a cheating task, provide the basis for 
an explanation of the discontinuity between verbal 
expression and moral behavior noted by Aronfreed. 
Henshel suggested that behavior is not dependent as 
much on simply “knowing” what is right as it is on 
“feeling what is ‘desirable.’“ Unless standards be-
come associated with emotional responses, children 
will be as free to violate these standards as were the 
310  DIENSTBIER ET AL. IN PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 82 (1975)
subjects in the cheating studies who could attribute 
their arousal to a pill.
Guilt and resistance to temptation. A second di-
lemma from the social learning literature is that al-
though a correspondence is assumed (in most ver-
sions of social learning theory) between guilt 
(usually as measured by projective techniques) and 
resistance to temptation, some studies have failed 
to show such a correspondence (Allinsmith, 1960; 
Burton, Maccoby, & Allinsmith, 1961; Maccoby, 
1959).
Some authors (e.g., Hoffman, 1970) have sug-
gested that one of the major problems with that lit-
erature is that researchers have seldom endeav-
ored to measure guilt in relation to the same types 
of transgression on which the behavioral measures 
are taken. Furthermore, the diffi culty of interpreting 
projective measures of guilt is often cited. Our ap-
proach lends support to that explanation and allows 
a further articulation of the importance of measur-
ing guilt and resistance to temptation with respect 
to the same transgression. As demonstrated by the 
cheating and child research, our approach empha-
sizes the high degree of dependency on immediate 
situational cues in attributing causation of emotional 
arousal. Thus it is quite likely that individuals who 
make causal attributions about the internal origins of 
arousal (guilt) in one situation will fi nd that either 
their own past experience or current situational cues 
lead them to make more external attributions con-
cerning emotional causality (shame or fear of pun-
ishment) in other temptation situations. Signifi cant 
correlations between guilt and resistance to tempta-
tion should, therefore, be expected only when those 
dimensions are compared with respect to the same 
behavior. The only study that measured guilt and re-
sistance to temptation with respect to the same type 
of transgression found that a signifi cant relationship 
did exist (MacKinnon, 1938).
Cognitive Dissonance and Self-Perception 
Theory
The changing of the value of certain behaviors 
and objects through unnecessarily strong negative 
external inducement (threat) has been demonstrated 
by researchers investigating a hypothesis derived 
from cognitive dissonance theory. That hypothesis 
stated that children who receive a mild threat to in-
hibit an act will take more personal responsibility 
for resisting temptation than will severely threat-
ened children; they will therefore experience more 
cognitive dissonance over resisting temptation. Ar-
onson and Carlsmith (1963) and Freedman (1965) 
demonstrated that when children were given a mild 
threat to not play with a valued toy, they valued 
the forbidden toy less (Aronson & Carlsmith) and 
played with it less (Freedman) than was the case 
under severe threat. The sophisticated control con-
ditions of the Freedman study (fi nding no threat-ef-
fect differences when there was no opportunity to 
play with the toy during the threat-relevant period) 
allowed the elimination of many potential explana-
tions alternative to the dissonance-derived hypoth-
esis.
A more recent literature has developed indicat-
ing similar effects for unnecessarily strong posi-
tive inducements (reinforcement). The thinking of 
deCharms (1968) on the importance of perceived lo-
cus of control in motivation led to research on the 
overjustifi cation effect by Deci (1971,1972), Krug-
lanski, Alon, and Lewis (1972) , and Lepper, Green, 
and Nisbett (1973). This research indicated that 
when an individual is offered reinforcement for a 
task he would have performed without payment, he 
acts (in future situations without payment) as if he 
were less intrinsically motivated than before the un-
necessary payment,
Both the dissonance and the overjustifi cation re-
search provide support for Bem’s (1972) self-per-
ception theory-that individuals tend to consider all 
available evidence in assessing the motivation un-
derlying their own behavior, just as an observer 
looks for all the forces relevant to another’s behavior 
in making attributions about the other’s motivation. 
Our approach suggests that the overjustifi cation and 
dissonance results are due to the effect that an offer 
of tangible reinforcement or threat of severe and tan-
gible punishment has on reducing attributions about 
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the internal cause of positive and negative emotions. 
But by focusing as it does on the ability to change 
causal attributions of emotion associated with and 
resulting from behavior after the behavior has been 
performed, our approach suggests that reinforcement 
or punishment given after the fact will often create 
effects similar to inducements and threats made be-
fore the fact. This conclusion from our studies with 
children is reinforced by the fi ndings on “retrospec-
tive misattribution” by Loftis and Ross (1974) cited 
earlier. The importance of this extension becomes 
more obvious when we consider that socialization 
efforts are usually made after some motivational fail-
ure has occurred.
As suggested earlier, the extent to which punish-
ment or reinforcement draws attention to itself rather 
than to the preceding behavior will be infl uenced not 
only by the specifi c form of punishment or reinforce-
ment but also by the style of administration and the 
situation. Thus while tangible reinforcers, such as 
physical punishment, are likely to draw the attribution 
of emotional response toward themselves rather than 
to the preceding behavior, certain approaches may ac-
centuate that process. Information that suggests that 
the administered reinforcement should be suffi cient 
compensation and an adequate inducement for future 
performance should increase the likelihood that plea-
sure derived from the task itself (from the means, as 
well as from the completion) will be attributed instead 
to the reinforcement.
This approach may be useful in illuminating an 
apparent contradiction in the recent overjustifi ca-
tion literature. Unexpected prizes administered to a 
group of game-winning students by Kruglanski et 
al. (1972) had the effect of reducing liking for those 
competitive games (compared to nonrewarded win-
ners), while children who received unexpected prizes 
for good drawing in the Lepper et al. (1973) study 
did not later behave as if their prizes caused them to 
devalue the special drawing task used. From our per-
spective, the critical difference lies in the changed 
attributions resulting from Kruglanski et al. telling 
their subjects that they had been promised the re-
wards prior to the games (which in fact was not true) 
and in giving tangible reinforcers (plastic puzzles), 
which were salient during the game ratings because 
they were given before the rating. The positive emo-
tional response resulting from playing and winning 
the games was apparently partially attributed to the 
prizes. In the Lepper et al. study, however, the unex-
pected reward group was not misled to believe that 
their rewards had been previously promised nor were 
those rewards salient at the time the dependent mea-
sure was taken; their awards had been posted (sev-
eral days previously) on an “award board” that was 
not present in the classroom in which the dependent 
measure was taken.
Our approach leads to a theoretical integration be-
tween fi ndings associated with achievement motivation 
and the overjustifi cation research, an integration very 
similar to that which is apparent between the punish-
ment literature (in natural settings) and the dissonance 
literature. Research in the achievement area indicates 
that while gestures of parental love and affection (non-
tangible reinforcers that do not draw attention from the 
child’s behavior) are related to high achievement moti-
vation in boys, the administration of tangible reinforc-
ers by parents is not associated with high achievement 
motivation (Rosen & D’Andrade, 1959; Spence, 1970; 
Winterbottom, cited in McClelland, Atkinson, Clark & 
Lowell, 1953).
THE COGNITIVE AND AVOIDANCE THEORY 
INTERFACE
Cognitive development theories of morality, 
as exemplifi ed by the writing of Piaget and Kohl-
berg, are too extensive to be reviewed here in de-
tail. Rather, cognitive developmental theory will be 
briefl y outlined and the relevance of that approach 
to the proposed theory will be explicated at a gen-
eral level.
Piaget (1932) postulated that the development of 
the child’s moral judgments corresponds to the de-
velopment of other more general cognitive capac-
ities. Prior to the development of suffi cient cogni-
tive fl exibility, the child makes moral judgments 
in strictest conformity to established rules, view-
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ing behavior as totally right or wrong, basing that 
assessment on the outcome of an act regardless of 
the intent of the actor, and believing in the concept 
of “immanent justice”—that punishment will auto-
matically and surely follow transgression, with ma-
turity and cognitive fl exibility, moral judgments be-
come more fl exible, with rules seen as changeable 
depending on other constraints of the situation; the 
outcome of a specifi c act has less impact on the as-
signment of blame than the intent of the actor. In 
part, this transition to fl exibility is made possible 
through active participation in society and through 
rule making and changing, allowing rules to be 
seen as serving man’s needs. Social participation 
also encourages the acquisition of increased empa-
thy through interaction with peers,
Kohlberg (1958) extended Piaget’s approach to a 
6-stage sequence, each stage of which is defi ned by a 
different basis for moral judgment. In earliest stages, 
avoidance of punishment (Stage 1) and later the defi -
nition of right and wrong based on the valence of the 
outcome for the actor (Stage 2) prevail. Middle stages 
involve judgments based on the maintenance of so-
cial approval (Stage 3) and then on duty to laws and 
the prevailing social order (Stage 4). Higher stages 
are based on an understanding of the social-contract 
nature of social and legal systems and respect for the 
rights of others (Stage 5) and fi nally a recognition that 
legal and moral principles are often in confl ict, re-
solved through principles of conscience, logical con-
sistency, and mutual trust in fulfi lling higher values 
(Stage 6).
Neither Piaget nor Kohlberg has extensively ad-
dressed theoretical questions of the relationship 
of moral behavior to moral reasoning, or of the re-
lationship of affect and emotional arousal to moral 
reasoning. Kohlberg (1969) , however, approached 
our viewpoint by suggesting that affective responses 
would progress developmentally with cognitive re-
sponses and that for the higher moral stages, guilt 
would be associated with different types of trans-
gression. Thus for a Stage 6 individual, “guilt over 
violation of internal principles” would result; for 
the Stage 4 individual, guilt would imply “concern 
about one’s responsibility, according to rules”; for 
the Stage 3 individual, only shame would be expe-
rienced. 
Kohlberg’s astute analysis is completely compat-
ible with our orientation, but it is through the emo-
tion-attribution perspective that we can address the 
issue of the dynamics that account for this presumed 
usual compatibility of affect and moral judgment in 
the maturing individual, The key to our explanation 
is that temptation situations are basically unchang-
ing as the individual matures through the cognitive 
stages postulated by the cognitive-developmental 
theorists. That is, even though perceived somewhat 
differently with maturity, and even though differ-
ent responses become available, the basic issues that 
lead to the emotional arousal associated with temp-
tation remain essentially the same. It is, of course, 
impossible to prove this point, but it is diffi cult to 
name any moral issue faced by a mature adult in any 
sphere of personal or professional activity that does 
not have an obvious and basic counterpart for a 6-
year-old child. There are mature and immature forms 
of stealing, of being dishonest or disloyal, of hurt-
ing others or being unfair, or of being destructive 
to property and life. This view is supported by the 
moral dilemmas used in the Kohlberg (1958) system 
to assess maturity of moral judgment—the situations 
can be seen as posing ethical dilemmas to individu-
als at any stage of moral maturity.
How does this continuity of moral dilemmas pro-
vide a mechanism for understanding the (normally) 
continuing compatability of moral judgment and its 
supportive affect as the individual’s level of moral 
maturity changes? A basic tenet of our approach is 
that many moral dilemmas evoke a phobia-like re-
sponse, causing emotional discomfort as the indi-
vidual begins to seriously consider transgression as 
an option. But that emotional arousal will have dif-
ferent meanings (and will affect behavior differ-
ently) for individuals at different levels of moral de-
velopment. Thus one’s stage of moral development 
does not determine whether an individual will ex-
perience arousal, but rather once such arousal is ex-
perienced, one’s stage of moral maturity will infl u-
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ence what the arousal means and therefore whether 
the arousal is relevant to the available behavioral op-
tions. We do not wish to exclude the possibility that 
the level of maturity will infl uence one’s perception 
of the situation and that this perception will infl u-
ence the amount of arousal experienced, but the im-
pact of such initial perceptions on arousal level may 
be minimal.
As an example, we might consider the problem of 
killing others in a war, assuming a society in which 
parental instruction, the major institutions of society, 
and the child’s personal encounters with death all cre-
ate in the child a negatively toned emotional arousal 
at the prospect of causing another’s death. Other fac-
tors that might support this arousal include the recog-
nition of the extraordinary exercise of power in kill-
ing, the irreversibility of death, and the degree to 
which the behavior is relevant to the support of or 
the negation of self-concept. When ordered to kill in 
war time, individuals at different stages in Kohlberg’s 
(1958) moral development scheme would act differ-
ently. The Stage 4 individual, believing fi rmly in the 
supremacy of the law and the absolute need to uphold 
the law, would agree to kill, yet he would experience 
inhibiting negative emotional arousal (based on pro-
cesses such as those discussed earlier), which cannot 
be eliminated readily through cognitive control. Un-
less overwhelmed with negative emotion, his attribu-
tion of affect to a fear of killing would be suffi cient 
to make that negative affect less relevant, allowing 
him to kill (just as the shame-oriented child is able to 
transgress even when aroused if detection seems im-
possible, or as cheating is facilitated for the individ-
ual who can attribute his arousal to a placebo). With 
killing experience, the Stage 4 soldier’s emotional re-
sponse should decline relatively rapidly (since, as in-
dicated by Loftis and Ross, 1974, the attribution of 
arousal to an irrelevant source may facilitate subse-
quent extinction).
Individuals at Kohlberg’s Stage 6 would initially 
experience arousal for the same reasons and in a man-
ner similar to the Stage 4 individual. But principles 
based on individual conscience allow more latitude 
of outcome. One may hierarchically arrange personal 
values so that killing is required by conscience to de-
fend principles more important that the deaths in-
volved, or one may decide that killing cannot be justi-
fi ed by the principles defended by the war. In the fi rst 
instance, the arousal would be experienced as guilt 
(the individual assumes personal responsibility for the 
decision) over the anticipation of killing, but the attri-
bution of that arousal to the violation of moral princi-
ples would not prevent the killing—the arousal would 
be of little relevance since other moral principles as-
sociated with the nominal purpose of the war have be-
come more important. 
The Stage 6 individual who has concluded that life 
is more important than those principles defended by 
the military action, on the other hand, experiencing his 
arousal as anticipatory guilt over the killing, would fo-
cus on his arousal as relevant to that behavior. There-
fore, the arousal could be experienced as a manifes-
tation of the degree of opposition the individual feels 
toward killing and as evidence of the correctness of 
the decision not to kill. As the three hypothetical indi-
viduals approach their battlefi eld decisions, increasing 
arousal will therefore have different impacts on each. 
The Stage 4 individual, feeling his arousal as unwel-
come fear, might begin to feel cowardly and ashamed 
of his emotional reaction. The fi rst Stage 6 individual, 
feeling anticipatory guilt, would feel more confused, 
wondering if this increased arousal should be taken 
as evidence of the wrongness of killing and hence 
of a need for the reordering of those values that fa-
vored killing. The second Stage 6 individual would, 
of course, become more convinced of the correctness 
of his decision not to kill.
Emotional arousal and cognition are thus seen to 
interact in a complex manner, with behavioral out-
come determined by the outcome of that interaction. 
When either is overwhelming, it may tend to dom-
inate despite the counterinfl uence of the other, but 
in the normal middle ground of life, that mechanism 
which permits us to display our humanity (when hu-
manity is defi ned in the old-fashioned manner as the 
dominance of the rational over the appetitive and 
emotional) seems to depend heavily on our ability 
to experience our emotion as inoperative by attribut-
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ing it to causes not relevant to the present situation. 
Tomkins (1963) wrote that it is “one of the major 
functions of any negative affect theory to guide ac-
tion so that negative affect is not experienced,” and 
that this represented “affect at a distance” (pp. 320, 
321). We would agree, but add that the major func-
tion of any theory that seeks to integrate cognition, 
affect, and behavior must provide an explanation 
of how cognition, more differentiated and complex 
than affective responses, may moderate the impact 
of emotional arousal on behavior, even while failing 
to completely dominate or eliminate these affective 
responses.
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